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1  Thus Offe, for instance, contends that the "core problem" in current East European states
"resides in their lack of any non-contingent 'givens' which would be suitable fixed parameters of
the politics of reform.  Precisely because the system is at such a deadlock, everything becomes
contingent and nothing can self-evidently remain as it is" (Offe 1997, 41).
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Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics
Randall L. Calvert and James Johnson
1.  Introduction
Rampant uncertainty, fluidity, and indeterminacy are central, perhaps defining, features of
politics in post-communist Eastern Europe (Bunce and Csanadi 1993).  Analyses of politics in the
region regularly stress what one writer refers to as "the helter-skelter of post-communism, . . . the
bewilderment of life since 1989" (Brown 1994, 17).  In post-communist states, then, political
actors find  themselves in a situation where the entire political world is "in flux."  Because in such
circumstances many of "the old political labels" are "anachronistic and misleading" there is both an
urgent need for, and intense struggles to impose, "new political definitions" (Brown 1994, 35).
1 
The situation in Eastern Europe is, in this sense, an instance of a more general pattern in
transitional polities where "the very parameters of political action" are not just "in flux" but are
"arduously contested" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 3-6).  In this paper we explore in a
preliminary way the nature of such contests and identify theoretical resources that might enable
social scientists to better understand them.  We believe that beyond their substantive importance
for understanding politics in post-communist states, such contests illuminate broader issues in
political theory.
In our estimation strategic conflicts among political actors in transitional polities revolve
not simply around competing interests but around conflicting interpretations.  We specify what we
mean by this in more precise theoretical terms below.  Here it is important to identify the general
substantive problem.  We assume that political actors are strategically rational in the sense that
they recognize that their environment consists, in part, of other equally rational, intentional actors. 
In more practical terms this means simply that when they formulate their own plans political
actors seek to take into account the expected actions of relevant others.  They therefore confront
the problem of making sense of their ongoing interactions.  From this perspective political actors
"are both goal-seeking and situation-interpreting individuals" (Fenno 1986, 4 stress added).  The
difficulty arises because in social and political interaction intentions and interpretations are related     
2  It is possible to state this in more general, philosophical terms. "On a causal-instrumental
account of rationality, our standards of rationality must depend upon our view of the character of
this world and upon our view of what we are like . . . Clearly [however] there is an interplay. We
use our standards at one time to discover the world's character and our own, and on the basis of
this new understanding we modify or alter our standards so as to make them, as wielded by us, 
(most likely to be) most efficacious in that kind of world (as we newly understand ours to be). 
The process continues, for those new standards lead to still further modifications in our view of
the world and of ourselves, and hence to newer standards and so forth. Our view of the world and
of ourselves, and our notion of what counts as rational, are in continual interplay" (Nozick 1993,
134-5).
     
3  "What is regarded as an 'insult to the armed forces,' and 'act of secession,' or a 'threat to
property' is hardly a constant.  Nor is it possible to specify a priori how specific social sectors will
interpret the situation and react" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 27).
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in complex ways.
2  In unsettled circumstances such as those that obtain in post-communist
countries this poses an especially acute political problem.  
Analysts of the region suggest that indeterminacy makes it difficult for political actors to
articulate interests and, therefore, to formulate preferences (Ost 1993; Bunce and Csanadi 1993). 
We think, instead, that actors in the region face a more basic and, arguably, more acute problem
that derives from the fragmented, ambiguous, and inadequate character of available interpretive
resources and the distinctive sort of political conflict to which this gives rise.  "Since anything can
mean virtually anything, any and every interpretation of what is happening and the impact of what
is happening is possible. . . . In such a situation it is natural for individuals to try to make sense of
everything by creating a rational interpretive scheme that they then force onto the situation"
(Bunce and Csanadi 1993, 270).
3  Political actors face an ongoing problem.  They must jointly
recognize some particular, partial, and often contested scheme for interpreting other actors,
institutions, and events.  Unless they successfully do so the social and political world will remain
"in flux."  The problem, of course, is especially acute insofar as this hardly is a purely cooperative
endeavor.  Political actors advance and defend interpretations that are competing in the sense that
they are partially or wholly incompatible.  They strive to impose those interpretations on others.  
Examples of such interpretive contests are common enough in contemporary Eastern
Europe.  In much of the post-communist world the idea of "Europe" has become a powerful
interpretive resource.  Minimally, “Europe is the opposite of what we have and what we want to
get rid of - it is the absence of communism, of fear and deprivation” (Drakulic 1996, 12).  More
expansively it commonly is held to symbolize a constellation of  Western commitments to, for
instance, democracy, commerce, civil society, respect for human rights, and so on (Konrad 1995). 
In either case, “there is an assumption that everyone knows what we mean by Europe” (Drakulic
1996, 11).  Yet even this seemingly unambiguous and attractive idea has been subject to intense
interpretive conflict.  In Romania, for example, the idea of “Europe” is passionately contested by
political actors intent on imposing quite divergent interpretations on their new political world.  On4
the one hand, liberals endorse the idea of "Europe" as cosmopolitan and, as such, as "the source
of the political and economic forms that Romania should adopt."  For nationalists, on the other
hand, "it means a neoimperialist menace threatening Romania's independence" (Verdery 1996,
105).  Interpreted in light of pre-1989 Romanian communism the idea of Europe clearly lends
itself to disparate renderings.  Just as clearly, the outcome of this conflict of interpretations -
judged in terms of the ability of the contending groups to render "Europe" salient after their own
fashion - is of considerable importance for the way that political actors understand their ongoing
interactions.
Strategic conflicts of interpretation are a  general and persistent feature of politics that, we
believe, is heightened in transitional politics.  We defend this claim in two ways.  Substantively,
we focus on the politics of constitution-making in contemporary Eastern Europe.  This allows us
to illustrate various sorts of interpretive conflict in more concrete terms.  Theoretically, we rely on
a range of rational choice, and specifically game theoretic models of politics.  This allows us to
demonstrate that the sorts of conflict we identify are pervasive in politics generally and not merely
an artifact of transitional circumstance.  We believe, somewhat controversially, that game
theoretic analysis can illuminate both the concrete examples of East European constitutional
politics and the more general problem of political indeterminacy that they exemplify.  This view is
controversial in at least two respects.  In the first place, analysts tend to depict transitional politics
as qualitatively different from more settled or "normal" politics (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). 
They also commonly identify the circumstances in post-communist East Europe as unique even as
compared to other political transitions (Bunce and Csanadi 1993, 266-7; Offe 1997, 31-2).  In the
second place, this assessment of transitional politics as especially fluid and uncertain often makes
those same analysts skeptical about the usefulness of established social scientific tools for the
study of political-economic transitions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 4; Bunce and Csanadi
1993, 273).  By contrast, we argue that game theoretic models enable us to establish that normal
politics is not so settled and, therefore, that transitional politics is not so uniquely indeterminate as
is commonly supposed.
Periods of transition like that underway in contemporary Eastern Europe present social
and political actors with complex, ongoing coordination problems across multiple domains.  As a
result, "the transformation of the post-communist societies should be understood as an inherently
uncertain process with a plurality of possible outcomes" (Pogany 1996, 569).  There is, from this
perspective, clearly no guarantee that the transition from communism will generate a more stable,
efficient, or normatively attractive set of political economic arrangements (Przeworski 1991;
Bunce 1993).  Indeed, some doubt that the intuitively appealing aspiration to simultaneously
establish constitutional democracy and market economies in post-communist societies is internally
coherent (Elster 1993b; Offe 1997, 29-49).  They may be correct.  Even if we set such doubts
aside, however, there minimally are -- in addition to various forms of constitutional democracy --
three plausible alternative outcomes to the post-communist transformations.  They may result in
[i] authoritarian regimes in which markets, democracy, or both are at best partially
institutionalized, [ii] military dictatorships of various political persuasions, or [iii] unstable polities
plagued by ethnic or religious divisions (Pogany 1996, 575-6).  Any of these outcomes might be     
4  An equilibrium is an outcome generated by the interdependent choices of strategic actors.  In
equilibrium each actor is doing what she thinks is best for her, given her expectations regarding
what relevant others will do.  As a result, in equilibrium, no actor has reason to unilaterally act
otherwise.  Note that to characterize some outcome as an equilibrium in this sense does not entail
that that state of affairs is efficient, fair, or otherwise normatively attractive (Schelling 1978, 26-
7).
     
5  This is not a tendentious interpretation.  Despite his own aversion to rational choice models
Lijphart endorses a broadly rational choice account of the constitutional politics that produced
these equilibrium institutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  On the notion of
equilibrium institutions see Calvert (1995a; 1995b).  On the various mechanisms that can generate
such equilibria see Knight (1992; 1995).
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stable in the sense that it could constitute what game theorists call a coordination equilibrium
(Ordeshook 1992; 1993).
4  For strategic actors, then, transitional politics constitute a "derived
coordination problem" (Calvert 1992, 11-13: 1995a, 242-3). They are caught in ongoing but very
poorly defined interactions, where the anticipated long-term stakes are substantial, and where
experience - whether of success or otherwise - at one stage is not easily generalizable to
subsequent encounters.
A constitutional arrangement represents one possible resolution to this sort of complex
coordination problem.  A constitution is a set of general rules that govern social, political and
economic interactions and that are relatively difficult to change.  A consitution typically specifies
rules for at least three domains: "individual rights, the machinery of government, and procedures
for amending the constitution" (Elster 1993a, 175).  Beyond that, however, constitutions are fairly
arbitrary in a quite specific sense.  By definition a coordination problem gives rise to multiple
equilibria.  Consequently, various specific constitutions, containing a variety of different
provisions, might serve to coordinate political-economic interactions in a given society.  This is
relatively easy to see in East Europe even if we confine our attention to just part of one of the
three domains mentioned above.  Consider the "machinery of government."  This category
minimally will establish an electoral regime and specify the relations between executive and
legislative institutions.  Once established these political arrangements typically exhibit two features
of what, in game theoretic terms, are equilibrium institutions.  First, they are stable in the sense
that "drastic changes in electoral systems and shifts from presidentialism to parliamentarism or
vice versa are extremely rare" (Lijphart 1992, 208).
5  Second, they are quite various.  The
electoral systems in the region are diverse ranging from the extreme PR system in Poland to a
nearly majoritarian arrangement in Hungary (Lijphart 1992; Lucky 1994).  Similarly, the
"emerging democracies in East and Central Europe offer a more diverse range of configurations"
of executive-legislative relations "than any other region of the world" (Shugart 1993, 32).  They
range from purely parliamentary in Hungary, to different types of mixed presidential-parliamentary
arrangement in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, to relatively strong presidentialism in Poland
(Lijphart 1992; Shugart 1993).  In short, when considered only along these two dimensions, the
consitutions of post-communist states coordinate politics in very different ways.       
6  Brennan and Buchanan (1985). For a critical survey see Hardin (1988).
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Outline of the paper.  In the next section, we review the rational choice literature on
constitution making.  The traditional approach, contractarianism, focuses on how political agents
agree ex ante to rules that will bind them in the future.  More recent approaches focus on the
more important problem of coordinating the expectations of participants and acheiving a self-
enforcing constitutional equilibrium.  We argue that existing accounts continue to neglect
important features of constitutional politics, particularly those revolving around conflict of
interpretation and processes of deliberation.  
Section 3 spells out phenomena that are basic to any empirical understanding of
constitution making but that find no place in the existing models.  It also suggests this omission
reflects well recognized, larger difficulties in game theory, specifically the tension between the
needs of closed-system formal modeling and the open-universe character of many political
settings.  The section concludes by identifying some initial attempts by game theorists to create a
more encompassing approach to the modeling of rational political actors.
In section 4, then, we propose a model of our own that formalizes some of the processes
of deliberation and interpretation previously omitted from rational-choice theories of
constitutional politics.  In this model, we give the actors a shared repertoire of similarity relations
that can be used to construct arguments on principle.  These arguments, in turn, contribute to the
players' selection among equilibrium patterns of play, whether to establish constitututions or to
apply them to particular cases.  Transition and democratic politics appear then simply as
successive stages in a series of coordination games.  Finally, section 5 explores some implications
of the model both for the study of transitional politics and of other, ostensibly unrelated,
phenomena of democratic politics.
2.  Constitutions as Coordination
Traditional rational-choice accounts of constitution-making and constitutionalism have
regarded a constitution as a sort of contract, and constitution making, therefore, as an exercise in
contracting to achieve well-defined gains from trade.
6  Mueller (1991) applies the contractarian
model specifically to the Eastern European transitions. More recently, however, a few authors
writing about constitutions in general and about the East Europe transitions in particular, have
suggested that the classic game-theoretic problem of "coordination" (Hardin 1989; Ordeshook
1992;1993; Schelling 1960). They argue that this model both captures important features of the
problem of establishing a constitution that the contractarian model elides and avoids some flaws in 
the contractarian model.
While the coordination approach, as developed thus far, makes an important theoretical
advance over previous constitutional theory, it too ignores some prominent features of the7
process of building and maintaining a constitution.  Both the contractarian and the coordination
model are open to the criticism that they underestimate the difficulty participants have in
connecting their future interests to the politics of the transitional era; neither model admits any
interpretive activity by the participants.  On the coordination view, constitutionalization is still, in
theory, a simple story of bargaining followed by automatic self-enforcement.  We propose to
reformulate the coordination model in ways that highlight how the making of a constitution, and
life under that constitution, consists of an unending series of different coordination problems, in
which the solution of one is never a perfect guide for the solution of subsequent ones.  Our
approach accords central theoretical roles to "arguing" (Elster 1995), deliberation, and
interpretation, and sees a lasting constitution as an evolving convention, rather than a static
accomplishment.
The state of nature and the constitutional contract
Discussions of the value of political order and the difficulties inherent in creating it often
point to the conflict of interests inherent under anarchy.  This is of course the focus of Hobbes'
Leviathan, as well as of subsequent discussions of the constitution of government as a
contract among citizens (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan 1985).  In the posited "state of nature," each
individual is tempted to take what others have, and the absence of political order is a state of
conflict that is bad for everyone.  Political order restrains this conflict, making everyone better off,
or at least everyone in some subgroup sufficiently powerful to maintain it.  Contention over
control of the political order, however, is a constant source of renewed violence and unrest.  On
this view, political order by means of a democratic constitution produces more peace, and
distributes the benefits of peace more widely.
When game theorists think of political order and constitutions in this way, they think of
the underlying problem as being analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma:  all would be better off to
keep what they have, leave everyone else alone, and have peace; but regardless of the actions of
others, each is tempted to try to take advantage by, say, stealing, cheating, or otherwise taking
advantage of others, either directly or using the political system.  In the absence of some sort of
enforcement of order, the inexorable result is political illegitimacy and widespread conflict.  The
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is illustrated in Figure 1, a simple two-player, two-alternative
version of the game.  In a PD, each player finds it unambiguously in his or her private interest to
"defect," regardless of what actions others take, with the result that both are worse off than they
would have been if both had "cooperated."  In the language of game theory, to defect is a
"dominant strategy" for each player, so that individual rationality allows for no other outcome
than mutual defection.  But this dominant strategy outcome is "inefficient" since an alternative
combination of choices, namely mutual cooperation, could have made both players better off.     
7   Taylor (1987).  They say the same about economic exchange; see for example Telser
(1980).
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Figure 1 -- Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1   Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3
Defect 3, 0 1, 1
note:  cell entries are payoff to player 1, payoff to player 2
The problem of establishing an authoritarian political order seems to be solved fairly
readily in the real world, despite the recurrence of unrest, and it has little occupied political
thinkers.  Establishing a democratic constitution, however, is far more problematic in practice;
seen from the standpoint of the Hobbesian state of nature, this is no wonder.  If the central role of
government is to suppress conflict among the governed, and if there is no recourse to outside
enforcement of constitutional rules, how can democratic control be established over the PD
conflict inherent in the state of nature?  If any agency is given the resources and organization to
enforce order, what can keep them from destroying democracy and taking all the gains of peace
for themselves?  A democratic constitution must be self-enforcing, and in the Prisoner's Dilemma
setting, it's difficult to see how it can be.  A constitution is said to be like a contract, in that a
contract of exchange governs a situation very much like this:  each party to an exchange would
like to obtain the goods or money of the other party without performing his own side of the
bargain.  A contract prevents this through the credible threat of outside enforcement.
Repeated political interaction
Political theorists inclined toward game-theoretic thinking have pointed out, however, that
this PD situation in social interaction often does not have such a one-time nature.  Rather, it
represents a situation that is repeated between the same individuals.
7  In that setting, the
temptation to steal, squeal, or "defect" in the PD may be controlled, not by outside enforcement,
but by the possibilty of continued cooperation if each party behaves itself.  For example, suppose
that the game in Figure 1 is repeated indefinitely many times, with future payoffs being discounted
by a factor * per period.  Whereas defection was the dominant strategy in the one-time game in
Figure 1, in the repeated version of this game unconditional defection is not a dominant strategy: 
depending on how one's opponent plays the game, it may, even in purely selfish terms, be better
for one to cooperate than to defect.  For example, suppose that player 1 employs the famous "Tit-
for-Tat" (Rapoport and Chammah 1965) strategy in the repeated game:  begin by cooperating;
and on each iteration therafter, do whatever your opponent did on the previous iteration.  Then an9
opponent who always defects will earn a payoff of 3 on the first iteration and 1 on every iteration
thereafter.  But an opponent who always cooperates will earn a payoff of 2 on every iteration.  If
the discount factor d is not too small, that is, if future payoffs are not discounted too heavily, then
a rational player would choose cooperating over defecting.  Figure 2 illustrates the actions and
payoffs for the two players under either of these strategies.  Specifically, the profile of strategies
in which both players use Tit-for-Tat is an equilibrium in the repeated game, and results in a self-
enforcing pattern of cooperation on every turn by both players.  Thus the conditional promise of
continued mutual cooperation convinces each player to keep cooperating as long as the other
does so too.
Figure 2--Actions and Outcomes in the Repeated PD
Tit-for-Tat against Unconditional Defection:
period 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
actions:
Player 1 (Tit-for-Tat) C D D D D . . .
Player 2 (always Defect) D D D D D . . .
payoffs: discounted sum:
Player 1 0 1 1 1 1 . . .   * /(1- *)
Player 2 3 1 1 1 1 . . . 3 +  * /(1- *)
Tit-for-Tat against Tit-for-Tat:
period 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
actions:
Player 1 (Tit-for-Tat) C C C C C . . .
Player 2 (Tit-for-Tat) C C C C C . . .
payoffs: discounted sum:
Player 1 2 2 2 2 2 . . .  2/(1- *)
Player 2 2 2 2 2 2 . . .  2/(1- *)
Taylor (1987) first explored the implications of repeated-game cooperation for democratic
theory, pointing out that cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma interactions could be the
basis for political order without government, obviating the need to design a democratic
constitution.  One need not go that far, however, to accept that rational cooperation as a result of
repeated interaction may represent exactly the kind of self-enforcing rules necessary to a
democratic constitution.  On this view, a constitution is not analogous to an externally enforced10
contract.  Rather, the constitutional agreement is an agreement to pursue a particular cooperative
equilibrium in an ongoing problem of social cooperation.
Convention and coordination
Hardin (1989) however, points out that such a "contract by convention" (see also Hardin
1982) is still an insufficient conceptual tool for understanding the problem of establishing a
constitution.  Even a simple cooperation problem may be solvable by an infinity of different,
equilibrium cooperative arrangements (Taylor 1987: 78-79,103).  The trouble is, each of these
may be incompatible with the others, and if individuals do not share the same expectations about
which of them is in effect, cooperation is likely to break down.  Illustrating this using the repeated
version of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma in Figure 1 seems a little artificial, but gets across the
general point.  Suppose that one player expects the following equilibrium:  both players will play
Tit-for-Tat with respect to the odd-numbered iterations of the game only, and both players will
ignore, and always defect on, even-numbered turns.  Again, if d is large enough, this combination
of strategies would be in equilibrium, and would yield payoffs of 2 in every odd-numbered
iteration and 1 in every even-numbered one.  But suppose the other player anticipates the use of
Tit-for-Tat on even-numbered turns, with mutual defection expected and accepted on all odd
turns.  Such a combination of strategies would yield a payoff of 1 in every odd-numbered iteration
and 2 in every even-numbered one.  These patterns of play are illustrated in Figure 3.  Either
strategy combination will yield the players a higher payoff than would unconditional defection. 
However, if one player plays according to the first (Odd TFT) equilibrium while the other plays
according to the second (Even TFT), the result will be perpetual defection (except for a couple of
initial instances of  unilateral cooperation).  Each player ends up punishing the other for perceived
violations of the expected cooperative pattern, and the gains from cooperation are lost.  In a more
general version of the repeated PD with many players, varying payoffs, or incomplete information,
even efficient, "full" cooperation is achievable via several different, incompatible equilibria.  In
general, it is important that both players have the same, or similar, expectations about who should
cooperate, when, in what way, and what are the acceptable reactions to a deviation from that
pattern.
Thus in order to solve its problems of cooperation, a society must coordinate on one such
arrangement.  There are many forms of cooperation each of which would make all citizens better
off than non-cooperation in the state of nature; but some will be better off under one equilibrium,
while others prefer a different arrangement.  Establishing a constitution is a problem of
coordination with mixed motives.  The simplest version of a game embodying such a problem is
that shown in Figure 4.   This game has very different properties than does the one-shot Prisoner's
Dilemma from Figure 1.  If one expects one's opponent to take action x, one wishes to take action
x; if y, then y.  If such a game has been played before or discussed in advance by these two
players, they may have an easy time deciding what to do; otherwise, they are willing to attempt a8  The simplest way to formalize "trial and error" and its costs is through the symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the game in Figure 4.  If the game is played once only, it has three
equilibria: the two coordinated pure strategies yielding a payoff of 2 to one player and 1 to the
other; and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player randomizes between x and y.  For the
payoffs given in Figure 4, this means playing x with probability 2/3 and y with probability 1/3,
yielding an expected payoff of only 5/9 for each player--worse even than the less favored pure-
strategy equilibrium.  This result holds true for all such coordination games.  In the absence of any
reason to focus on one or the other pure-strategy equilibrium, the mixed-strategy equilibrium
captures the whole “problem” of the coordination problem; to solve the problem is to discover a
way to achieve one of the pure-strategy payoffs dependably.
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solution by trial and error.
8  In terms of the repeated cooperation game, strategy x might represent
the Odd TFT 
Figure 3--Actions and Outcomes When Players Expect 
Different Cooperative Equilibria
period 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
actions:
Player 1 (Odd TFT) C D C D C
Player 2 (Odd TFT) C D C D C . . .
payoffs: discounted sum:
Player 1 2 1 2 1 2 . . .  (2+ *)/(1- *2)
Player 2 2 1 2 1 2 . . .  (2+ *)/(1- *2)
period 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
actions:
Player 1 (Odd TFT) C D D D D
Player 2 (Even TFT) D C D D D . . .
payoffs: discounted sum:
Player 1 0 3 1 1 1 . . . 3d + * 2/(1- *)
Player 2 3 0 1 1 1 . . .  3 +  *2/(1- *)
strategy and strategy y the Even TFT strategy, or more properly, unbalanced versions of them
that require one player to cooperate more often than the other to avoid retaliation, so 
that there is substantial disagreement about which of the cooperative strategies is more desirable. 
In terms of political interaction, the strategies of the coordination game represent different
possible whole systems of mutual obligation, expectation, and retaliation; any one of these
combinations would comprise a specific political or constitutional order.12
Figure 4--A Game of Coordination
Player 2
x y
Player 1            x 0, 0 2, 1
y 1, 2 0, 0
note:  cell entries are payoff to player 1, payoff to player 2
Solving the coordination game is a matter of establishing a convention (Lewis 1969;
Hardin 1982), rather than establishing a contract.  The most important difference is that, whereas
all parties to a contract must agree to be bound by it, a convention requires much less extensive ex
ante agreement in order to become, in effect, binding on all affected parties (Hardin 1989).
On Hardin's view, then, the problem of establishing a constitution, of making the transition
to democracy, becomes a problem of bargaining over which of many possible conventions will be
agreed to.  If the conflict of interest across different conventions is small, and the value of
coordination over disagreement is large, the problem is nearly one of pure cooperation; some
participants in the East European transitions saw their situation this way.  Przeworski writes that
"several voices in Poland suggested that the country should just take any old Western European
constitution and be done with it" (1991: 85-86).  And Laszlo Solyom, president of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court, said in a recent interview that at this late date he "does not see the real
importance of drafting a new constitution" to replace Hungary's putatively provisional one,
"because the existing constitution works" and has gained "legitimacy and acceptance," while the
right moment for gaining widespread support for a new one has passed (Mink 1997: 73).  From
these viewpoints,  if coordination can be established, any reasonable constitution will serve; and if
no improvement in coordination can be had, there is no point in writing a new, "improved"
constitution.
More often, all parties to the bargaining will insist on a convention that is not too unkind
to their own interests.  Once the bargainers agree, the convention they agreed upon becomes a
focal point (Schelling 1960) in society's constitutional coordination game.  If enough parties in the
society accept the outcome, all others will find it in their interest to go along with it as well, so the
problem of establishing the necessary self-enforcing order is less daunting than that of establishing
a externally-enforced contract (Hardin 1987).  Once the bargaining problem is solved by
agreement upon a convention, constitution making is complete.  This is not a trivial problem, of
course, even in theory:  conflicts of interest may make the bargaining problem insuperable, and the
coordination problem in question is so complicated that the bargainers can scarcely know whether
an agreed-upon solution will actually comprise an equilibrium, or fail to be self-enforcing.  But13
Hardin's approach suggests an appealingly simple analysis of what is involved in establishing a
constitution.  We believe that, unfortunately, this analysis omits consideration of several factors
that complicate, and are critical in understanding, the problem of democratic transition.  We
return to these below.
Ordeshook (1992), following Hardin's general approach, opens up broader possibilities by
distinguishing between two different levels of choice:  the choice among procedures, which takes
place at the time of constitutional negotiation but can be opened up again at any time; and
choices, using those procedures, among policy alternatives, which goes on continuously. 
Ordeshook agrees that creating a constitution is a problem of coordinating choice among a great
variety of equilibria in a setting of repeated interaction.  But he notes that "social action [can be]
coordinated also by a variety of informal norms 
. . . that can coincide with more insidious things such as ethnicity, language, and race," so a
constitution "must be designed to compete with other things for the political-economic
organization of society.  . . . [it] must establish a set of stable and self-generating expectations
about peoples' actions that overcomes alternative expectations" (148-49; see also Johnson 1997).  
Moreover, on Ordeshook's view a constitution is supposed to be a lasting guide to
resolving political conflict and making political choices.  Its "rules . . . must be clear to allow for
subsidiary planning and strategic maneuver" (151) over political decisions without itself coming
undone.  On the other hand, at the level of policy choice constitution-framers ought not "try to
'nail down' every detail and negotiate every contemporary political conflict, with the consequence
that they are uinlikely to secure much allegiance in public debate and cannot coordinate political
action for very long" (149).  In short the constitution is to provide a guide that will be compelling,
when compared to competing loyalties, ideologies, or principles, across a long future of various
and unforeseeable political conflicts.  Like Hardin, Ordeshook draws on a model, the
establishment of an equilibrium in a coordination game, that would seem to require the
participants to succeed in one big initial coordination problem, the framing of a constitution; this
agreement can then be publicized and gain acceptance (Ordeshook 1992: 147), following which it
can guide all political decision making for a long time to come.  Citizens then avoid further
constitutional conflict and stick to fighting out policy issues under the constitution's rules:
If I cannot know which procedure will most benefit me in the future and if I value
the time that can be saved by avoiding incessant debate over process as each
opportunity to decide something arises, then I will prefer committing to the same
'fair' procedure in every circumstance.  Even if issues arise in which I see
temporary advantage in some alternative procedure, . . . I should choose to abide
by the status quo procedure if deviations unlock the door to future chaos . . .
(Ordeshook 1992: 158).
Ordeshook's available "procedures" are just instances of the systems of mutual obligation and
expectation that made up the strategy sets of the Hardin model:  politicians take certain actions in
the expectation that other politicians will act, in turn, in some specific way.  In framing a14
constitution, participants must coordinate on these, and this is the coordination game that both
Hardin and Ordeshook consider formally.  But then Ordeshook's constitution assists citizens in
"coordinating" in the making of future policy decisions, so that they are always operating under a
fixed and agreed-upon set of rules that channel political conflict.
In these instances, the threat persists that other, more "insidious things" such as ethnic
loyalties will take over the definition of the rules of conflict.  This persistent danger hints that the
framing of a constitution has not coordinated things once and for all, as claimed.  If a constitution
is the solution to a coordination problem, rather than to a PD, but coordination problems occur
constantly, then in what sense exactly has the constitution coordinated anything?  It is to this
theoretical puzzle that we turn below.  First, however, let us (1) specify the empirical puzzles that
the Hardin and Ordeshook models seem to leave unresolved, and (2) situate the whole question in
a much more fundamental theoretical puzzle in game theory.
3.  Unresolved Issues
Before we elaborate our model it will be helpful to clarify the full implications of the
coordination model, both as a theoretical venture seen in the larger context of game theory, and as
a model of constitutionalism and transitions in view of the struggles over interpretation that
occupy so much of the effort of framers and citizens.  We turn first to some empirical phenomena
that the coordination view, as presently formalized, seems to omit.  The phenomena in this list are
by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, one of our main goals is to show that they are closely
related.
Substantive issues:  The problem of interpretation
The role of "arguing" in constitution making.  Elster (1995) distinguishes two modes
of discourse in constitution making:  "arguing" and "bargaining."  It is easy to identify bargaining
in the coordination model as well:  in trying to choose one coordinated outcome or the another,
the participants are bargaining over the alternate distributions of the gains from coordination.  But
if we understand "arguing" as the enunciation of principled, general-welfare-based reasons for
preferring one constitutional alternative over another, it seems to have no place in the simple
coordination problem.  Perhaps in an extended, incomplete-information version of Hardin's model,
one might find rational participants attempting to share information with one another about the
true values of payoffs in the coordination game, and thus about efficiency gains.  This form of
arguing alone, however, wouldn't capture an important aspect of the arguing over principles that
takes place in politics:  arguments and principles sometimes have force independently of the mere
sharing of information and contrary to the immediate interests of the participants.
A prominent example may be found in the Hungarian transition and early elections to the
National Assembly.  The combined regional-list and single-member-district electoral system that15
emerged from Hungary's Roundtable talks in 1989 was a compromise between old-name parties
(which, weighted by membership, tended to represent the rural-populist interests) and the
communists and urban-intellectual opposition, who could offer prominent candidates but whose
party names would attract few additional votes (Sajo 1996a: 84).  This system turned out,
unexpectedly, to produce a strongly disproportionate relationship between votes and seats. 
Immediately following the first elections in 1990, "the losers began to play up the difference
between the popular vote and the parliamentary representation . . .  The winners too act[ed] as if
they were conscious of an embarrassing gap" (Arato 1994: 27).  In response, the populist,
plurality Hungarian Democratic Forum, although it stopped short of forming a grand coalition
with all the non-communist parties, "did cobble together an 'overly large' coalition . . . [and]
proceeded to make a political pact with the AFD [Alliance of Free Democrats], the main
opposition party, to amend the constitution.  The 1994 winners [the majority, post-communist
Hungarian Socialist Party], having received only 33 percent of the popular vote, acted in an
analogous fashion" (Arato 1994: 27).  Both these pacts had considerable practical impact.  The
price for AFD support in the 1990 "pactum" was that the presidency be awarded to the AFD's
Arpad Goncz (Ilonszki 1993: 261), who still holds that post even though the AFD has never
formed a government.  The post-1994 parliamentary committee to propose a permanent
constitution adopted a requirement that a 2/3 (later amended to 4/5) vote would be required in
order to report a draft, which would require extensive support even from outside the
supermajority governing coalition.  Why did the HDF and the HSP voluntarily forgo their
opportunities to make policy more to their liking when they had the ability to do so?  Evidently
they feared creating a climate of illegitimacy that might destroy the young constitutional order,
making any policy victories short-lived.  Arato puts it this way:
The winners of each election . . . disclosed through their actions that they were troubled
by a merely procedural legitimacy and the potentially weak democratic basis of any
government built upon the consitutionally minimum number of parliamentary votes (Arato
1994: 27).
Even though they won fair and square under the agreed-upon constitutional rules of the game, the
HDF and HSP felt constrained as well to adhere to the principles of proportionality and
constitutional consensus.  The initial agreement on the Hungarian constitution (or rather
constitutional amendments) was not merely a coordination on a mutually agreeable set of
procedures.  It was accompanied by arguments over principles, such as the desirability of
moderately proportional representation and the need for broad consensus on a constitution, that
stood behind the agreement, and many of those principles were themselves broadly accepted and
acquired constitutional force.  Yet the statement of such principles plays no explicit role in the
simple coordination model of transition.
Arguing over principles after the constitution is made.  Once a constitution is
established, how it should be applied in an actual situation is often unclear from the written
document itself.  As a result, the problem of coordination on procedures continues within a
constitutional system; it has not been solved by the initial agreement.  The simplest illustration of     
9  According to Pogany (1993: 340 n. 46), this phrase is a rough translation of the Hungarian
term jogállam.  Pogany says that jogállam translates more happily to the German Rechtstaat, "a
concept which is more exacting than the rule of law doctrine" as more generally understood.  Our point is
that this is a principle predating the Hungarian constitution, one of many principles that a court or other
political agency might call upon to justify political actions or prohibitions.
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this lies in the frequent application of precedent to determine the rules for a given situation. 
Anytime precedent is invoked in stating the correct constitutional procedures to follow, we know
that the rules as originally given were not sufficient to ensure common expectations about those
procedures.  Often, of course, political actors argue over what precedents to apply, disagreeing as
a result on what procedure will be constitutional or legal in a given case.  Somehow that
disagreement must be settled (often by a president or a court), and a particular arguement is
thereby declared the correct one and established for future reference in making similar decisions. 
This procedure is of course fundamental to systems of case law, but it applies to politics more
broadly.
It is not merely precedents that are argued over after a constitution is in effect.  Unwritten
or general principles are invoked again and again to guide future claims about what actions are
proper and constitutional in ambiguous cases.  Often, competing principles are pitted against one
another.  This is especially obvious in the work of courts, where a constitutional doctrine once
enunciated will be used repeatedly, in a variety of subsequent cases, and often elaborated to
produce new principles.  Consider for example the Hungarian constitutional declaration that
Hungary shall be "a state conducting itself according to the rule of law."
9  The Hungarian
Constitutional Court "has pursued its role of constructing 'a state founded on the rule of law' with,
at times, remarkable vigor" (Pogany 1993: 341).  The Court has applied the doctrine to all
legislation passed by the present or any previous legislature under the current (although now
extensively amended) constitution (Pogany 1993: 342), including those under the communist
regime.  It has used that doctrine to decide important parts of subsequent cases, generating new,
subsidiary principles in the process.  Examples include the principle of "novation of old promises"
from the Compensation Cases (Klingsberg 1993: 45-47) and the concept of "legal certainty" in
the welfare reform decisions of 1995 (Sajo 1996b).
The need for such principles beyond the words of the constitution, and the careful
elaboration of constitutional principles after the constitution is already ratified, are phenomena
that have no place in either a world where, as in Hardin’s formalization, the constitution solves a
coordination problem once and for all, or where, as Ordeshook tacitly assumes, a constitution
provides principles that can be depended upon to coordinate all future political conflict.  Arguing
over principle may have a strategic element, as Elster (1995) suggests, but even this element does
not appear in the simple coordination model.
Deliberation.  Democratic theorists traditionally, and with renewed enthusiasm recently,
identify deliberation as a key feature of democratic politics.  Citizens and officials who exchange
arguments, respond to them, and alter their expectations and demands because of them are     
10  Przeworski (1991: 17-18) also offers a compelling discussion of why deliberation cannot be
expected, even in principle, to eliminate genuine political conflict in a democracy.
     
11  The near-crisis was set up by the Court's 1994 ruling that the legislature's power to negate Court
decisions applies only to cases in which the Court overturns laws, not to those in which it overturns
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engaging in a deliberative process.  Deliberation seems to be none other than the kind of arguing
over principles as we have just described it.  But what does deliberation add to the process of
making decisions, particularly among rational actors?  Democratic theorists claim that it consists
not merely in bargaining over the gains from some policy decision, but in the pooling of
information or the alteration of participants' basic preferences (for example Manin 1987, Warren
1992).  Although we agree that deliberation is more than mere bargaining, we also find standard
accounts implausible for reasons spelled out elsewhere (Knight and Johnson 1994).
10  And as
Waldron (1996: 2189) puts it, "In the real world, even after deliberation, people will continue to
disagree in good faith about the common good, and about the issues of policy, justice, and right." 
What happens as a result of deliberation, if anything, is that decisions are legitimated in the eyes of
the losers, and future decisions are implicitly limited by the arguments the winners have just made. 
Just as in the case of Elster's constitutional "argument", however, this poses the question:  If
deliberation is not the mere making of bargains, does not result in binding rules, and does not alter
participants' basic preferences so as to eliminate conflicts of interest, then how can it have such
effects?
Interpretation.  Similar to arguing over precedent or principles in an ongoing
constitutional system, participants are frequently called upon to interpret constitutional
requirements whose application to a given situation are ambiguous.  This is of course what
constitutional courts are primarily designed for, but officials in all parts of government offer
interpretations to justify actions they want to take or want others to take.  This constant need for
interpretation contrasts with Ordeshook's suggestion that a constitution settles the rules of
procedure so that participants can concentrate on competing over political issues alone.  On the
contrary, the appropriate procedure to use is a frequent matter of dispute, through which
participants often attempt to gain policy advantage.  
It is easy to provide examples of such wrangling over the appropriate interpretation of
constitutionally mandated procedures.  During the long-running dispute over presidential powers
under Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's government, President Walesa asserted various
rights to control the hiring of cabinet ministers, the firing of members of the National Board of
Radio and Television, to control the military, and to dissolve the Sejm, based on what others
regarded as tendentious interpretations of the provisional constitution; Walesa made some of
these new powers stick, and in other cases issued threats based on his new powers in order to
achieve policy goals (Osiatynski 1995: 40-41).  In Romania, where each legislative chamber has
the responsibility to make its own procedural rules but the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction
over those rules, in 1994 the Court invalidated several such rules necessitating their revision by
both chambers and momentarily threatening a constitutional crisis
11 (Bach and Benda 1995).  Onechamber rules.  The Judiciary Committee of the Chamber of Deputies voted to reject this interpretation,
and proposed an override of several of the 1994 invalidations.  Had the Chamber followed this advice, the
status of those Chamber rules would have been in direct dispute.  Fortunately, the Chamber acquiesced in
the end.  Bach and Benda (1995) provide an account of these events.
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could object that these disputes over interpretation and thus over what procedures have been
constitutionally agreed upon occurred in unsettled situations, where the constitutional agreement
was not complete:  Walesa's interpretations were predicated on infelicitous and ambiguous
wording in the provisional Polish constitution, while the Romanian disagreement took place when
the rules were first being ironed out and adhered, after all, to constitutional guidelines.  But such
disputes over procedure occur frequently in 200-year-old constitutions as well, as demonstrated
by periodic executive-legislative confrontations in the United States.
To motivate a particular interpretation of a constitutional mandate, participants resort to
extra-constitutional principles, to precedent, and to all sorts of arguments of similarity--the claim
that a current situation resembles in important ways some other situation that is less ambiguously
covered by constitution or by previous interpretation, and therefore should be treated in the same
way.
When is coordination achieved?  Hardin  and Ordeshook surely make a conceptual
advance over the contractarian model when they portray constitution making as a solution to a
coordination problem.  They clarify the level of enforcement needed to keep a constitution in
place, and whence that enforcement must come.  They also provide some flavor, missing from the
contractarian picture of simple exchange, of how, in the terms quoted at the beginning of this
paper, the transitional situation is "in flux" and "the very parameters of political action . . .
arduously contested" without abandoning rational choice analysis.
Yet the static coordination analysis that Hardin and Ordeshook provide leaves no room
for arguing, deliberation, interpretation, or the appeal to precedent.  The intuition that the initial
agreement on a set of constitutional procedures solves some sort of coordination problem is
attractive; at least, that agreement focuses citizen and politician attention on a small set of
possible effective actions.  However, it does not complete the job of coordination.  New situations
are constantly encountered in which constitutional prescriptions are sufficiently unclear to be
disputed.  In attempting to gain the agreement of a sufficient number of participants about what
procedure is appropriate, the disputants do not merely make offers or counteroffers, as in
bargaining, about what procedure they would like to see implemented.  Instead, they also adduce
reasons why everyone should agree that in principle a given procedure is appropriate in this
ambiguous situation.  They interpret the meaning of the constitution for a given situation that was
not anticipated by the framers or ratifiers.  Even the losers in such a decision may find that
interpretation legitimate.  How are these interpretations left open by the initial coordination on a
constitution?  Can the form of that agreement influence the later interpretations?  What role does
interpretation play in the coordination problem posed by a new situation?  To help us understand     
12  This is fig. 6.4. in Kreps (1990a, 170).
     
13  Kreps points out that in the sort of interaction captured by this model, even "sophisticated"
conceptions of adaptive learning like that proposed by Milgrom and Roberts (1991) offer scant
analytical purchase.
     
14  For a recent example that is relevant to our own concerns see Crawford and Haller (1990).
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not only transitions but also the ensuing constitutional politics, we propose below a model that we
think captures all these activities in a single conceptual framework.
The general theoretical problem
The survey that we present in the last section allows us to chart connections between
several seemingly disparate observations regarding the indeterminacy of game theoretic analysis. 
At the same time it prompts us to stress the importance of explanatory mechanisms that seem, at
first blush, not to fit neatly into a game theoretic framework but which are especially promising in
strategic analyses of constitutional politics.
Kreps (1990a, 169f) discusses briefly the following simple repeated two-person game
where, in each stage game, players are randomly matched and the value of payoffs X and Y are
assigned randomly and independently of one another along the interval [0,10].




Player 1            U X, 5 1, 3
D 2, Y 5, 6
note:  cell entries are payoff to player 1, payoff to player 2
In this ongoing interaction "there is zero probability that any game in the sequence is precisely the
same as a game played earlier" (Kreps 1990a, 170).  As a result, it is exceedingly difficult for
players to establish with any confidence what might count as the sort of relevant prior experience
upon which they might rely as a guide to developing reliable expectations regarding future play.
13 
This game underscores the extent to which game theorists typically assume "that participants in
competitive situations have some notion of which situations are similar and which are not, a
notion that itself is built up from experience" (Kreps 1990a, 172).
14  Yet, as our discussion in the     
15  In fairness, theorists who rely upon repeated games acknowledge this difficulty. "Perhaps
the most important shortcoming of the Prisoner's Dilemma supergame as a model of the process
of public goods provision is that it takes place in a static environment: The supergame consists of
iterations of the same ordinary game.  In some of the public goods problems of interest here, a
more realistic description of reality would require a changing payoff matrix, possibly a changing
set of available strategies, and even a changing set of players. These changes, especially the first,
might be the result of influences external to the game or of the history of strategy choices of the
players themselves. . . . The possibilities here are very numerous, and it is impossible to make any
general statements about the effects of extensions of this sort . . . These effects would depend
very much on the particular manner in which the game changed over time" (Taylor 1987, 107-8). 
See also Calvert (1992, 12).
     
16  Myerson (1991, 112-13) points out that it is especially important to understand that focal
points are complex causal mechanisms that incorporate both cognitive and motivational factors. 
They clearly trade upon some conception of salience that allows players to discriminate among the
available equilibria and to coordinate on one among them.  But focal points also pick out
equilibria in the technical sense.  Put otherwise, salience alone is not sufficient to induce a stable
outcome, yet absent some focal quality the problem of multiple equilibria often resists analysis.
     
17  Another, related instance surrounds the way that players understand who are the relevant
parties to a given interaction.  Game theorists encapsulate such knowledge in the range of "types"
that populate models of incomplete information.  See Myerson (1991, 74-83).  But, as is the case
with focal points, they have little to say about where such types come from.  On this issue see
Johnson (1997).
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last section makes clear, in the context of constitutional politics this assumption is very nearly an
heroic one.
15  There we explained that since, even in the best of circumstances, past experience is
far from unambiguous, players cannot assume that they share criteria of similarity and
dissimilarity.
At this juncture game theorists will by now almost instinctively invoke the idea of a "focal
point" (Schelling 1960).  A focal point is an equilibrium outcome that players for some reason
invest with special salience.
16  It is not clear, however, that this notion provides much immediate
assistance here.  As Kreps correctly points out, any focal point itself minimally presupposes that
relevant players share some criteria of similarity (Kreps 1990a, 172f).  Game theorists have little
to offer on that question.  In particular they have little to say about just how focal points are
created or about how they coordinate expectations (Kreps 1990a, 101).  Focal points thus appear
to present an "essential limit" on the explanatory power of game theoretic models (Myerson 1991,
113).  Here, we confront a specific instance of a broader theoretical difficulty.
17  Game theoretic
models provide greatest purchase in the analysis of "closed universe" problems, that is, of
circumstances "in which all the possibilities can be exhaustively enumerated in advance, and all the
implications of all the possibilities explored in detail so that they can be neatly labeled."  The
difficulty is that most situations of interest in political economy - including the circumstances of     
18  In this sense game theorists take the situation that we depict in the last paragraph as a
challenge and a research agenda.  See Kreps (1990a, 183-4) and Myerson (1991, 113-4).
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constitutional politics - are "open universe" problems where such a prior and exhaustive
enumeration and labeling of possibilities is implausible (Binmore 1990, 119-20,144,178).  What
we require, and what we currently lack, is some theoretical apparatus with which to understand
how strategic actors interpret and label otherwise indeterminate interactions.
It may appear that this conclusion merely confirms the skepticism that, as we noted earlier,
analysts of political economic transitions express toward standard social scientific analysis.  That
appearance is deceptive.  For while we currently lack the theoretical apparatus that we need to
understand social and political indeterminacy, there is no reason to conclude that this difficulty is
insurmountable.  It is true, of course, that game theoretic models presuppose that we can specify
"precise protocols" (Kreps 1990a, 92-5).  They presuppose, that is, that we can specify in a
plausible way the rules governing the social or political interactions we wish to explain.  This
obviously limits the applicability of existing models.  It does not, however, mean that we should
abandon or deride efforts to extend existing game theoretic techniques in directions that might
allow analysis of indeterminate situations.
18  The hope here is not that game theorists actually
might generate models that portray a fully "closed" world.  The hope, instead, is that they might
develop techniques that can usefully capture one or another dimension of indeterminacy or
uncertainty and, in that way, enable us to more fully and confidently explain social and political
interaction.  That said, there is no reason to expect that game theory can accomplish this task
single-handedly.  It surely is the case that "certain things can only be expressed informally"
(Binmore 1990, 119).  Indeed, every extension of formal techniques very likely will demonstrate
that the domain of those things is larger than we now appreciate.  The challenge here is to develop
informal analyses in such a way that they both draw upon game theoretic results and illuminate
problems that are not amenable to game theoretic analysis.  We turn now to some informal
strategic concepts that hold out just that promise.
Informal Approaches
Kreps (1990b) surveys a large portion of contemporary economic theory with an eye
toward examining how the strategic actors who populate that theory proceed in the face of the
sort of "open universe" that we mention above.  He focuses on the theoretical problems posed by
"unforeseen contingencies."  These are states of affairs that, for some reason, relevant parties ex
ante fail to anticipate.  Because such states are inevitable, Kreps argues that strategic actors
necessarily will be compelled to formulate and convey to relevant others a set of general, simple
and, therefore, easily interpretable principles to govern how the actor will react to unforeseen
contingencies.  Kreps calls this set of principles and the manner in which they are conveyed
"corporate culture."  By constructing a particular culture, a strategic actor at the same time
provides herself with the components of reputation or identity, and others with grounds for
reliable expectations about how she will proceed in indeterminate circumstances.       
19  In any case, it is an empirical matter whether in any given case strategic actors are moved
by efficiency or by distributive considerations.  On this issue see Knight (1995).
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Kreps makes two assumptions that, in combination, limit the scope of his analysis.  In the
first place he assumes that strategic actors are concerned less with distributive considerations than
with coordinating in an efficient manner.  This may be a reasonable assumption when analyzing
market interactions.  It seems strained, however, in analyses of politics generally and
constitutional politics in particular.
19  In the second place, Kreps does not discriminate sufficiently
between two sorts of unforseen contingency.
An unforseen contingency is a set of circumstances that ex ante the parties to the
transaction had not considered.  Unforeseen contingencies need not be
unimaginable: Individuals may simply be unwilling to spend time thinking through
all possibilities, on the grounds that it is too time consuming and expensive to do
so.  Or it could be that the circumstances really are ex ante unimaginable.  From
the point of view of our development, either interpretation is fine (Kreps 1990b,
116-17).
These two sorts of contingency are not equivalent.  In one case actors simply fail, for some
reason, to assign a probability to a foreseeable event.  In the other case, they simply never
consider that event at all (Nelson and Winter 1982, 66-7).  If we wish to recognize that
constitutional politics is an "open universe," it makes a difference whether whether actors neglect
contingencies due to oversight or costs or whether they are truly unforeseen.  It makes a
difference because if we treat contingencies as what Kreps calls "unimaginable" it is implausible to
assume, as he does, that "unforeseen contingencies follow patterns," and hence that actors will
accommodate them through some process of adaptive learning (Kreps 1990b,117).  Moreover, if
we recognize that in constitutional politics strategic actors very likely are motivated as much by
distributive concerns as by the goal of efficient coordination, we then see how, due to his own
substantive preoccupations, Kreps underestimates the complexity of interpretive conflicts.
Ferejohn (1995) reports on joint research that extends Kreps in useful ways.  He suggests
that in most states the judiciary constructs what he calls an "interpretive regime" that consists in a
general conception of government power and its limits and a set of informal "norms or
conventions that regulate the interpretation of legal materials, including statutes" (Eskridge and
Ferejohn 1994, 267).  Like corporate culture on the account that Kreps provides, an interpretive
regime allows judges to construct reputations or identities upon which other strategic actors, both
in the legal domain and in the sphere of politics more generally, can formulate reliable
expectations.  In this sense interpretive regimes facilitate coordination.  But, as Ferejohn remarks,
"because they have far reaching political effects, these regimes are contested" (Ferejohn 1995,
205).  There is, in short, no assumption that judges or other political actors are preoccupied with
efficiency or that interpretive regimes rest on consent.  When they construct an interpretive
regime judges impose upon relevant constituencies a particular, partial, and typically contested     
20  In a series of reports Arato (1994; 1995; 1996) provides useful background to our
discussion.
     
21  "Since its establishment in 1989, it has dealt with scores of difficult problems including
property restitution, the powers of the President, the legitimacy of capital punishment, and the
suspension of the statute of limitations for homicide and treason committed during more than four
decades of Communist rule" (Schwartz 1993, 31).
     
22 For a first hand account see the interview with the President of the Court, Laszlo Soylom,
conducted by Mink (1997).
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conception of the political world - of its boundaries, of the sorts of actors who inhabit it and the
range of options they confront, and, therefore, how we can expect political actors to interact.
Ferejohn (1995, 206-7) briefly identifies a sequence of interpretive regimes in American
judicial history.  Here we explore an emergent example from East Europe, the role of the
constitutional court in post-communist Hungarian politics.
20  The constitutional court is an
unprecedented component of the Hungarian political order (Paczolay 1993, 43-4).  It has, in the
post-communist period, been not only "extremely active" but "very controversial" (Schwartz
1993, 31).
21  The Hungarian constitution provides for a very open system of abstract judicial
review.  Any citizen has the right to petition the Court to review any parliamentary enactment
(Schwartz 1993).  In the process of deciding these cases the Court has articulated an "interpretive
regime" in just the sense Ferejohn suggests.
22  This regime combines a deferential posture with
regard to Parliament with a set of rule of law canons that center on particular conceptions of legal
continuity and legal certainty (Klingsberg 1993; Morvai 1993-94; Paczolay 1993, 33-35).  In part,
the Court has adhered to this regime in a fairly rigid way in response to legal and political
indeterminacy in the post-1989 period (Paczolay 1993).  And because their rulings have
important, far reaching political consequences, critics actively contest the interpretive regime that
they have constructed (e.g., Sajo 1996b).
This conflict of interpretations emerges when we examine some of the court's rulings.  In
early cases, the court first overturned and then upheld legislation meant to impose "retrospective
justice" on officials of the Communist regime.  The court initially overturned as ex post and hence
unconstitutional a bill that would have extended the statute of limitations on political crimes
committed under the old regime (Morvai 1993-94).  They argued that the rule of law incorporates
a view of legal certainty that precludes retroactive legal changes.  The court subsequently upheld
a law that sought retrospective justice not by extending the statute of limitations but by invoking
international law to which Hungary was signatory at the time that the alleged crimes of torture
and murder were committed.  In this way, the court encouraged the parliament to pursue its aims
in ways that could be justified within the rule of law and to which the court itself could thereby
defer.  Observers discern this same pattern in cases involving property restitution and the transfer
of the mass media from public to private ownership and control.  On this view the court has
imposed an interpretive regime that locates the proper source of political power in the parliament24
and encourages elected officials to articulate and justify their political programs in terms
consistent with constitutional principles (Klngsberg 1993).  Other observers, however, challenge
the Court by claiming that its ruling in particular cases reflect narrow political preferences.  This
was one response to their ruling in the retrospective justice cases (Morvai 1993-94). It also
informs criticism of a more recent decision that overturned legislation on welfare reform.  Critics
of that decision argue that the Court is imposing a view of substantive justice at odds with both
economic reform and, more importantly, the formal requirements of the rule of law (Sajo 1996b). 
The court itself, however, insists that its decision to overturn provisions in the welfare reform bill
that eliminate social welfare benefits simply reflects its commitment to legal consistency and legal
certainty.  It claims that, since citizens have developed expectations based upon premises of a
certain level of welfare provision, legal certainty and continuity with earlier law precludes the
government from suddenly rescinding those benefits (Mink 1997, 74).  In essence, the Court
defends its rulings in these various cases as consistent applications of the same interpretive
regime.
4.  A model of ongoing coordination
We attempt in this section to formalize some previously un-modeled features that should
be present in a model of constitutional politics in order both to capture the coordination problem
and to motivate the activities of arguing, interpretation, and deliberation.  At present we are far
from a formal analysis on a level with Crawford and Haller (1990) or Milgrom and Roberts
(1991).  What we want to establish here is:  (1) a prima facie case that notions from rational
choice theory, centering around the game theory of coordination and communication, hold
promise of allowing us to theorize about the problems of constitutional transition about which
Bunce and Csanadi (1993) and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) despair of applying received
social science methods; and (2) a consistent account of the activities of rational actors in
constitutional politics that explains the effort they seem to devote to arguing about principles in
the process of inventing and interpreting constitutional doctrines.
Situated games
In order to conceptualize both the making of a constitution at the moment of transition,
and simultaneously the need for argument, deliberation, interpretation, and appeal to precedent,
we need to model not only the available actions and resulting payoffs captured by a traditional
game-theoretic approach, but also the situation to which the game corresponds in the real world. 
Just because two completely different situations in the real world can be represented as identical
coordination games between the same players, there is no reason to expect that those players,
having achieved coordination in the first game, can easily translate their agreement to the second. 
The situations may look the same to the game-theorist, but not to the participants.  Therefore
instead of attempting to describe constitutional interactions merely in terms of coordination
games, we need to portray each game not only as having different strategies or payoffs, but also
as occurring in some specific physical or political situation.  Rather abstractly, we characterize the
situation in which each coordination game is played in terms of a "situation," a sort of label on the     
23  Of course, in the real world there are situations in which some participants would prefer the
risk of disorder over accepting the policy desired by others.  To portray this problem of
constitutional stability would require us to replace the game in Figure 4 with a stage game whose
payoffs vary, which therefore might not always take the form of a coordination game.  In this
paper we retain the simpler model in order to concentrate upon the use of deliberation and
interpretation to achieve political coordination when coordination is the only problem.  There is
no barrier in principle, however, to expanding this model to encompass the equally important
question of how a constitution can be held together in the face of stronger conflicts of interest.
     
24  That is, for any measurable subset A of S, m(A) denotes the probability that s will be drawn
from A.
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game that is common knowledge among the players as soon as the game is drawn for play, but
that may differ between two otherwise identical games.  We shall refer to these as "situated
games."  Two identical games having different situations are strategically identical, but the fact
that the players reach one of several equilibria in the first game may tell us nothing, theoretically,
about which equilibrium they will reach, or expect to reach, in the second.
The Basic Model
For concreteness, we begin with a simple model of a two-citizen "society" facing a series
of interactions in which each citizen is to choose between two alternative actions.  The interaction
at each period t, t=1, 2, . . ., is represented by a game G strategically identical to that in Figure 4. 
Think of each alternative action as a procedure that can be followed:  to propose a law, to bring a
case in court, to decide such a case in a given way, to vote on a bill, to impose an outcome by
force, and so on.  The alternatives also represent reactions to other players' actions:  to implement
a bill if passed; to obey a court decision; to vote against a candidate; to meet force with force; and
so on.  In a more realistic game with many players, including citizens and government officials,
and with many more alternative actions for each player, the combination of actions and reactions
chosen by all those players would resemble the processes of government under a constitution.  In
a given situation, if the actions of relevant participants are coordinated, the result is some policy
outcome and the maintenance of political order, an expected ability to choose policy outcomes
efficiently in the future.  If those actions are not coordinated, political deadlock or disorder
ensues, potentially making all players worse off even than if they had received an undesired policy
outcome.  The whole interaction would thus be an impure game of coordination, simplistically
represented by the two-player game of Figure 4.
23
Unlike the game illustrated in Figure 4, however, we now consider each iteration as a
situated game, with period t's situation is described by st.  Thus the games differ only in that they
represent different situations; for simplicity of analysis we keep them strategically identical and
maintain the assumption of complete information.  Each st is a realization of a random variable s
distributed on a set S of possible situations according to a probability measure m on S that is
common knowledge.
24  The fact that each game represents a different situation makes it natural to
assume that only through the situation can connections be drawn between the games played in     
25  That is, R is a subset of S×S such that for every s in S, (s,s) is always in R; and for every r
and s in S, (r,s) is in R if and only if (s,r) is also.  We can write interchangeably (r,s)0R or rRs.
     
26  That is, even if qRr and rRs, q and s may be incomparable under the relation R.
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different periods, and actions chosen accordingly.  So, for example, the players can use a strategy
that says, "in period t, we choose the actions (x,y) if st=a and (y,x) if st=b."  However, we rule out
the strategy that says "in even-numbered periods play (x,y) and in odd-numbered periods, (y,x),"
and even rule out the simple strategy "always play (x,y)."  We impose this seemingly arbitrary
restriction on strategies as a first attempt to address, in a tractable way, a world of recurring
problems of coordination whose universal solution does not simply follow from the solution of a
single instance of it.  In terms of constitutional coordination, our formulation forces the players to
agree, if at all, on a rule for taking specific combinations of actions in specific situations,
independently of the strategic structure of the game.
Similarity relations among situations
In order to portray interpretation and argument in constitutional politics, there are, it
seems to us, two alternative formal approaches we could now take.  The first, most closely
analogous to that taken by Crawford and Haller (1990), is to begin in a sort of state of nature
with respect to communication and culture.  In such a state, the players share no common ideas
about how different situations or actions are labeled or related beyond what is distinguished by
their preferences (that is, by the game-theoretic model's payoff values) and by their common
experiences developed in the course of playing the game.  In effect, there would be at the outset
no "language" for political discourse, no shared principles or concepts at all, except as these
emerge in the process of play.  The analysis of such a model would be quite valuable, but also
quite involved, and would go well beyond what we need to make our point in this paper.  
The second approach, which we pursue, is to assume that the players share some pre-
existing set of ideas about how one political situation might be considered similar to another, and
a language for talking about these.  In order to avoid baking the results in the cake, we will avoid
assuming any particular form to these ideas, which should properly be termed "cultural."  In all
cases of real-world interest, cultural ideas are insufficient alone to fully, uniquely specify a
constitution.  We will assume, moreover, that there are multiple ideas about the similarity of
situations, and that they may sometimes conflict; this leaves room in our model for competition
over arguments and interpretations.
To portray, as abstractly, simply, and generally as possible, the cultural tools with which
framers or politicians have to work in making arguments and interpretations, we consider binary
relations that generate notions of "similarity" on the set S of situations.  A similarity relation on S
is a reflexive, symmetric relation R on S.
25  R is not necessarily transitive,
26 but for any two
distinct situations r and s in S, we say that r and s are "similar" under R if there is some list of
situations s
1, s
2, . . . , s
n-1 such that rRs
1Rs
2R . . . Rs
n-1Rs.  Suppose for some similar r and s that s
1,
s
2, . . . , s
n-1 is the shortest such list; then n is the "distance" between r and s according to R.  If rRs27
directly, their distance is 1; the distance between r and itself is always 0.  If r and s are not similar,
then we say their distance is infinite.  If under the similarity relation R, the distance between r and
s is smaller than the distance between r' and s, we will say that r is more similar to s than is r'
according to R.  In a setting of constitutional politics, the set of cultural tools on which the
participants can draw for arguments is represented by a set U of similarity relations on S.  Thus a
pair of situations r and s may be judged similar according to some R in U but not according to
some other R' in U; or given three situations, r, r', and s, r may be more similar than r' is to s
according to their distance under R, but less similar according to their distance under R'.
Communication processes
In this paper we will deal only informally with the process of communication between the
players, but let us sketch the sequence of events that we have in mind.  We suppose that the
repeated plays of G are interspersed with communication stages in the following manner.  At
period t=0, before s1 has been drawn, communication between the players can occur according to
some process C0; and at each period t=1, . . . , after Gt has been drawn but before actions for
period t have been chosen, according to identical processes Ct.  The players receive no direct
payoff and bear no communication costs in any communication stage.  In each communication
stage the players may make proposals about future play based on the realized values of the st or
make claims about the implications of previous statements based on previous values of st.
Each communication process should afford participants the opportunity to suggest
constitutional provisions or interpretations of constitutional provisions, and to state reasons or
arguments in support of those suggestions.  Most simply, we might model each Ct as a
simultaneous-move game in which each player states a combination of actions such as (x,y) to be
taken in the game whose situation is st, together with a relation R from the "culture" U by which st
is similar to some situation that is explicitly covered in the constitution or that has already been
dealt with successfully in some previous period.  The available arguments themselves thus give
each player a hint about what his or her partner might do.  If the players suggest the same action
combination in Ct, they might then proceed to play it in Gt; if they state the same "argument" R,
they might appeal to that reason again in the future.  Thus they can establish a focal point in Gt as
well as perhaps establishing a focal point for future actions and methods of interpretations--the
kinds of argument, and thus the kinds of suggestions, that they will expect one another to give in
the future.  The players are engaged  in multiple coordination problems at once, and their actions
today may help solve tomorrow's problems.  A richer model of the communication stage might
offer the participants several opportunities, rather than a single opportunity, to exchange
messages before Gt is played, and the opportunity to make and reject proposals in a real process
of argument or bargaining.
If we give players in the initial communication stage C0 the special opportunity to assign
actions to many possible situations, then C0 is a good opportunity for the players to try to sketch
out how future games will be played, that is, to agree upon a constitution that specifies the actions
each player will take in a wide array of the possible future situations st.  We concentrate on the
participants' problem of partitioning S into situations that call for (x,y) and situations that call for28
(y,x).  To do so, they can either delineate particular members of S, that is, particular situations,
and prescribe actions in each situation; or they can invoke some of the culturally shared similarity
relations R and prescribe actions for all situations in some set that are similar according to R. 
Formally, a constitution is a mapping that specifies, for each member of some set of situations, a
specific coordinated pair of actions, either (x,y) or (y,x).  Although we ignore for now the process
of deciding how much time and effort to spend in attempting to elaborate and distinguish among
future situations, even the most extensive constitutions in the real world can specify
unambiguously only a fraction of the situations that political actors will actually encounter.  We
assume that some large proportion of S is left without any direct, unambiguous prescription of
constitutionally-sanctioned procedures.  For st-values in that leftover set, our formal model of a
constitution does not specify any actions.  In such cases, participants will have to argue in
individual cases about what, if anything, the constitution prescribes.
Once a constitution is agreed upon, s1 is drawn.  Very likely s1 is not one of the values
specified in the constitution.  If not, the players now face a coordination problem, trying to agree
on a coordinated combination of actions to take in this situation.  In the absence of such an
agreement, they can simply play the mixed-strategy equilibrium.  If they could use a common
notion of similarity to agree on an applicable similar situation, they would achieve a higher payoff. 
Each player is tempted to argue that s1 is similar to a constitutionally specified situation that gives
him a better payoff.  However, there is also an incentive to give up on pursuing one's "2 payoff"
and accepting the "1 payoff," since agreeing not only provides a coordinated outcome in the
current period, it also makes it slightly easier to coordinate in future periods, elaborating on the
constitution by adding, via precedent, another situation value for which a pair of actions is
prescribed.
Theoretical implications
The interesting equilibria in this game are those for which the following occur:  (1) Players
always follow constitutional prescriptions;  (2) when both players suggest the same action
combination during Ct, they both play in Gt according to that combination;  and (3) when the two
players suggest different action combinations in Ct and there is no constitutional prescription for
that situation, the players use the mixed strategy equilibrium in Gt .  In general such equilibria will
exist--along, as usual, with many others.  We conjecture with some confidence that, within this
class of equilibria, there will moreover be some in which agreement upon previously given
"arguments" influence future action suggestions and future arguments.
   These equilibria exhibit precisely the processes of arguing, interpretation, and deliberation
that appear in the substantive literature on constitutional politics.  In designing a constitution,
participants have the incentive to advocate and bargain over constitutional prescriptions based
purely on the outcomes those prescriptions will yield, on average, if followed.  This is the
behavior that follows from the contractarian and simple coordination models, and it is maintained
here.  In addition, however, participants in constitution-writing in our model also have the
incentive to state arguments for the provisions they advocate, in order to gain the support of other
participants based not only on the results of future play in the named situations, but also based on29
the possible future uses of that argument once it has gained currency and widespread recognition
in the transition process.  Finally, they have the incentive to combine these approaches, choosing
arguments that strike a balance between attracting other participants' support and providing good
outcomes for the chooser--in Elster's (1993a, 1995) phrase, the "strategic uses of argument."
In our two-person society, the value of having a constitution is seen most simply in the
fact that, if a situation has a constitutionally specified action, then the less-well-off player in that
period receives a payoff of 1, while the other gets 2; if the constitution's treatment of the two
players is, probabilistically, even handed, then each player's ex ante expected payoff is 1.5 per
period.  However, if a situation is not covered by the constitution, then, in the absence of any new
agreement, the players are stuck with the mixed strategy equilibrium, and their expected payoff is
only 2/3.  Participants are better off playing in situations for which actions have been prescribed. 
If they find themselves in situations where actions have not been prescribed, they have an
incentive to coordinate on new prescriptions by drawing on shared notions of similarity or on
precedents.  There is a dual incentive to support the orderly extension of constitutional
prescriptions by proposing and accepting reasonable arguments:  first, because of the immediate
gain in expected payoff, even for the "loser;" and second, because of the positive effect that
agreement now will have upon the likelihood of agreement in the future.  But these incentives do
not guarantee agreement in every situation, due to the difference between the participants'
preferences between the coordinated outcomes.
Thus it becomes clear in this model how a constitution amounts to a feat of coordination,
even though it leaves more coordination problems in its wake.  Without a constitution, citizens
are without a good basis for forming widespread, implicit agreement about legitimate government
action.  The prescriptions of a constitution, together with the experience of having agreed on it,
provide a basis for subsequent interpretation, deliberation, and agreement much richer than the
pre-existing cultural notions of "similarity."  The constitution "coordinates" in that it turns future
situations of potential social conflict and confusion into derived coordination problems that are
easier to solve.  But the process of coordination, through interpretation and deliberation, is
continuous under a constitution.
In our theoretical approach we have begun to take up the challenge posed by Binmore,
Kreps, Myerson, and others concerning the limits to game theoretic analysis.  Where do
expectations come from?  How do players in a political "game" come to share any common ideas
about what the available "strategies" are?  How, in general, can we take account of the "open
universe" of possibilities and innovations while maintaining the kind of closed model necessary for
formal analysis?  Our general answer is that we push the closed-model assumptions back one
more level in order to address one more level of social phenomena.  We explicitly model
communication, and assume that the content of that communication contributes to the
expectations of a game's players about other players' subsequent actions.  We assume a repertoire
of similarity relations on which communicators can draw to lend appeal to their suggestions.  This
appeal is not just based on preferences, but also on expectations about others' expectations, and
so on.30
5.  Implications
Our model of constitutional politics, like that of Hardin and Ordeshook, emphasizes how
the making of a constitution centers around the problem of coordination.  For a stable
constitutional order to become established, participants and citizens must come to agree to a
sufficient extent about the actions and reactions by political agents that are appropriate in each
future set of circumstances they will face.  Unlike previous analysts, however, we emphasize the
fact that those future circumstances can never be fully anticipated.
Constitutional interpretation
This fact is no minor complication in the Hardin-Ordeshook view of coordination by
constitutions.  The actual framers of a constitution attempt to delineate categories of future issues
and situations so that the constitution's assignments of responsibilities and powers will be clear,
but framers know their prescriptions will be subject to interpretation as real situations arise. 
Political actors in those situations will always have to ask, "Does the current situation properly fall
into this category or that one?"  Since this will often be an open question, and since the answer
will have policy implications that people have partly conflicting interests about, those future actors
will have opportunity and motive to attempt to promote favorable answers to the question and
discourage unfavorable ones.  Even under a stable constitution, political actors will forever
contend over competing interpretations of it.
In this competition over interpretations, the coordination problem that political actors face
is precisely analogous to that faced by the framers themselves.  The actors must agree to a
sufficient extent about the actions that are to be taken; in the longer run, participants generally
must agree to a sufficient extent about the interpretations that are being made, and the manner in
which they are being made, if the constitutional order is to remain stable.
Arguing and bargaining
Throughout the process, the interpretations made and arguments accepted in one instance
will influence future interpretations, and thus the future course of constitutional politics. 
Participants begin a constitutional system with common cultural factors--symbols and
expectations with which all members of the society are familiar.  These pre-existing conventions
are useful in guiding coordination upon a new constitution, but were not alone sufficient to
generate a political order.  Arguments made and accepted at the time a constitution is framed
become additional cultural resources, upon which people's expectations are known to have been
coordinated already, and which can be used subsequently in motivating future arguments and
interpretations.  But the written provisions of the constitution are also insufficient to fully specify
the terms of the political order.  Thus politicians enunciate additional principles such as that of     
27  As in the use of extraordinary majority requirements for proposing constitutional provisions
in Hungary, as described in Arato (1994, 1995).
     
28  Such as the Hungarian Constitutional Court's doctrines of "novation of old promises"
(Klingsberg 1993) and "legal certainty" (Sajo 1996b), cited above.
     




27 and constitutional courts adduce new principles derived
from, but not stated in, the constitution,
28 and draw on external sources such as international law
and the legal doctrine of Rechtstaat to supplement their constitutional interpretations.
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In our conception, for an argument or interpretation to be accepted by an individual it
must (1) appear likely to be accepted to enough other people, and (2) promise a sufficiently
favorable outcome to that individual, both immediately and through its future effects.  Since all
individuals concerned are simultaneously evaluating the likelihood of others' acceptance, we have
a problem of establishing a focal point precisely as it was originally formulated by Schelling
(1960).  Argument and interpretation, are, in short, precisely problems of coordination.  They
remain forever under a constitution, although the constitution and previous arguments and
interpretations may contribute toward the creation of later focal points.
Deliberation
We tend to believe that democracy really does involve some form of deliberation that is
separate from interest-based bargaining.  As we noted above, however, we reject the idea that
deliberation is merely an exchange of information, or that it alters participants' preferences about
policy outcomes.  Rather, we believe that deliberation solves ongoing coordination problems. 
Successful deliberation creates common expectations about principles that rationalize a policy
decision today, that are acceptable as general rules today, and that are likely to remain acceptable,
and thus to remain influential in policy making, tomorrow.  One might thus accede to, and even
support, a policy bad for one's immediate interests in order to solidify a principle that will redound
to one's longer-term interest.  A principle can have this effect because it can influence the
direction of future deliberation--because it creates future focal points.
Heresthetic
Riker (1986, 1996) introduced the notion of "heresthetic," analogous to rhetoric, to
describe the art of strategically posing political issues in a way that forces people to support them,
or that breaks apart coaltions that were based on previous formulations of ideological or policy
alternatives.  In some of Riker's examples, the desired result is acheived by the ordering of issues;
in others, by the invention of effective vote trades.  However, the purest form of heresthetic
maneuver is one that gains support or changes coalitions because of the way it is stated, linking it
with a different issue in such a way that others will find support or opposition newly compelling. 32
This is a big part of what constitution framers are doing when they engage in Elsterian arguing,
and what politicians do in the process of deliberation and interpretation.  
Riker gives the perfect example from modern American politics.  In 1970 the U.S.
government proposed to remove nerve gas weapons from it bases in Okinawa and ship them back
to the U.S. for storage or destruction.  Senator Warren Magnuson maneuvered to prevent a plan
to ship the weapons' through his state.  Initial, insufficient support was gained on a
straightforward proposal to ban such shipment, based simply on the potential danger the shipping
posed to his constituents.  To gain the needed additional support, Magnuson switched the subject
from the danger of the weapons to a seemingly unrelated issue:  the executive branch had made
this plan to remove nerve gas weapons from Japan without consulting the Senate, whose consent
is constitutionally required for international treaties.  The plan was not, strictly speaking, a treaty. 
However, the Senate had recently passed a (nonbinding) resolution (in connection with Vietnam-
War-era politics) stating that any negotiated change in the status of Japan under existing post-
World War II treaties ought to be cleared with the Senate.  The issue of Senate prerogatives in
foreign policy making was therefore a hot one at the time.  By making the issue one of
constitutional prerogatives of the Senate rather than local public health and safety, Magnuson
gained the necessary support (Riker 1986: 106-13).
In his heresthetical maneuver, Magnuson did not invent a new issue, or even make a
connection that anybody else couldn't have made.  But by stating the issue publicly, he turned the
nerve gas shipments into a threat of precedent-setting that would weaken the Senate
constitutionally, in a lasting way.  Once his suggestion was in the public domain, many more
Senators found it necessary to oppose the nerve gas shipments in order to maintain senatorial
powers, and the shipments did not occur.
Riker called heresthetic "an art, not a science" (1986: ix) because, although he could
describe what a heresthetic maneuver had accomplished after the fact using the tools of positive
political theory, its employment by politicians depends on the invention of new ways of posing
issues.  Had he modeled the Magnuson maneuver formally, he would have presented it as the
creation of a majority voting cycle, just as he did in many other cases (Riker 1982: 213-32; 1986:
58; 1996: 135).  Its dependence on innovation, however, makes heresthetic difficult to theorize
about directly.  Our model of ongoing coordination in constitutional politics provides a new tool
for examining heresthetic, namely doing so in terms of coordination and convention.  Although
we cannot predict the innovations and heretheticians will come up with, we can understand the
process by which it works by examining how the manner of stating issues can substantially change
people's choices on those issues.  This was something of a gap in Riker's approach:  if senators
already had preferences concerning nerve gas shipments and the preservation of Senatorial
powers, why should the rhetorical linkage of the two issues change anyone's voting behavior? 
The logic of ongoing coordination suggests where we might look for an explanation.  Once the
issues are connected, the connection has meaning for later episodes of deliberation and decision
making on other issues.  It affects the determination of future focal points.33
Constitutional Instability
Unlike static coordination models of constitution making, our approach also affords some
insight into what happens if some participants don't want to coordinate--that is, when
constitutional stability is not a coordination game.  Then instead of constitution-based arguing and
deliberation, we'd predict acts of destabilization, not necessarily even through organized collective
action, not necessarily through violence.  These might include claims that previous government
actions lacked constitutional legitimacy, or the urging of decision making principles based on
ethnic ties and contradicting established constitutional rules.  Anything that opponents can do to
direct citizens' attention and expectations to possibilties working against reliance on
constitutionally-grounded action will help prevent the development of focus on the constitution. 
Once a series of important decisions have been  made flouting the constitution, it loses its focal
quality.  This is a familiar idea, of course, but its compatibility with our model speaks to the
model's increased scope compared to the static coordination view.
Transitions
In view of this model of constitution making and constitutional politics, what new things
can we say about transitions and constitutions?  First, transition is a time when the principles by
which appropriate political actions are defined are most up for grabs.  Past means of guiding and
legitimating political decisions are, by definition, no longer useful for a variety of reasons:  they
have been widely judged to yield unsatisfactory results, their enforcement agencies have been
compromised, new issues have arisen that they manifestly cannot address, or new interests have
gained a much greater level of influence; and, importantly, it has become common knowledge
among political participants that these conditions hold.  Under such conditions, old ways of
thinking about government retreat to the status of other cultural factors:  common knowledge
principles, experiences, and expectations that may be used to inform new agreements, but that
themselves are insufficient to maintain a political order.  Although, as we have said, constitutional
argument takes place constantly, it is densest when a new constitution is being framed, because
prospective political actors need to establish a whole framework for future argument.
Second, we can clarify the role of interests or preferences in people's political actions
under the conditions of great institutional uncertainty that characterize a transition.  We began
with the assumption that politicians and other citizens have fundamental preferences concerning
the quality of their lives.  If they are able to make sufficiently accurate predictions about the
results of political actions, they may derive preferences over those actions.  Such predictability
requires a stable institutional setting.  Finally, then, participants may derive preferences over
alternate institutions.  Consitutional decisions during a transition are based on these derived
preferences; this is the basis of Elsterian "bargaining."  As we have seen, though, a written
constitution is but the basic outline of the constitutional system that will eventually emerge, so
Brown (1994), Bunce and Csanadi (1993), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and the other authors
cited in our introduction have reason for their pessimism about whether transitional politics can be
seen as a rational, a rationalizable, or an analyzable process.  Our model should allay that
pessimism.  Since there can, after all, be a rationality behind arguing, deliberation, and34
interpretation, we can hope after all to gain a unified understanding of both transitional and
constitutional politics.35
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